A mechanism for eliciting second-order beliefs and the inclination to choose by Karni, Edi
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Karni, Edi (2018) A mechanism for eliciting second-order beliefs and the inclination to 
choose. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10 (2). pp. 275-
285. doi:10.1257/mic.20160345 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/91835  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association 
publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on 
the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of 
the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be 
honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. 
 
The author has the right to republish, post on servers, redistribute to lists and use any 
component of this work in other works. For others to do so requires prior specific permission 
and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from the American Economic Association 
Administrative Office by going to the Contact Us form and choosing "Copyright/Permissions 
Request" from the menu. 
Copyright © 2018 AEA  
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
A Mechanism for Eliciting Second-Order
Beliefs and the Inclination to Choose
Edi Karni∗
Johns Hopkins University and University of Warwick
June 22, 2017
Abstract
This paper describes a direct revelation mechanism for eliciting
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Consider a decision maker who contemplates a choice that she will have
to make sometime in the future between two courses of action whose conse-
quences are uncertain. It is conceivable and arguably quite likely that the
decision maker entertains subjective beliefs about the likely realization of
the relevant consequences that cannot be represented by a unique subjective
probability measure. Instead, the decision maker’s beliefs are represented
by a set of prior subjective probability distributions on a state space. This
situation, dubbed Knightian uncertainty, was modeled in the seminal work
of Bewley (2002).1
While being unsure about what she believes, the decision maker might
expect that her beliefs will become clear by the time the choice must be made.
Being aware of this, the decision maker may also entertain “second-order
belief” regarding the likelihoods that diﬀerent “first-order beliefs” obtain. In
other words, the decision maker may entertain introspective belief over the
likely selection of diﬀerent priors that, in turn, govern her choice.
Second-order belief on the set of priors is a special case of the model of
Karni and Safra (2016), according to whom actual choice behavior is gov-
erned by a random selection from a set of preference relations representing the
decision maker’s states of mind. The selection process is depicted by a prob-
ability measure representing the decision maker’s introspective beliefs about
her likely state of mind at the time the decision must be made. Knightian
uncertainty is the special case in which the decision maker’s states of mind
are depicted by her subjective prior beliefs. Formally, let  be a finite state
space, ∆ () the set of lotteries on a finite set,  of outcomes, and  the
set of all mapping on  to ∆ ()  representing alternative courses of action
and referred to as Anscombe-Aumann acts.2 Menus are subsets of  Let Π
denote the set of priors that figure in the Knightian uncertainty model, then
according to Karni and Safra (2016), given any doubleton menu { } the
likelihood that  will be chosen is given by
Pr( | { }) = 
Ã
{ ∈ Π |X
∈
 ( ()) () ≥X
∈
 ( ()) ()}
!
 (1)
where  is an aﬃne real-valued function on ∆ () and  represents the
decision maker’s second order beliefs.
1For a more recent take, see Galaabaatar and Karni (2013).
2See Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
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Invoking Bewley’s Knightian uncertainty, Minardi and Savochkin (2015)
axiomatized a measure describing decision makers’ inclination to choose one
uncertain course of action over another and the level of confidence they have
in the superiority of the preferred alternative. Departing from the standard
revealed-preference methodology, Minardi and Savochkin characterize deci-
sion makers by binary relations on pairs of Anscombe-Aumann acts (that is, a
binary relation % on ×). Given two pairs of such acts, ( ) and ( 0 0) 
the relation ( ) % ( 0 0) is interpreted to mean that the decision maker
is more confident in the superiority of  over  than in that of  0 over 0
Minardi and Savochkin proceed to provide an axiomatic characterization of
the relation %, dubbed graded preferences, that allows its representation by a
functional  in the sense that, for all ( )  ( 0 0) ∈  × ( ) % ( 0 0)
if and only if  ( ) ≥  ( 0 0)  Moreover, they show that
 ( ) = Φ
Ã(
 ∈ Π |X
∈
 ( ()) () ≥X
∈
 ( ()) ()
)!
 (2)
where  and Π are as above and Φ is a capacity measure on the subsets of
the set of priors.3
According to Minardi and Savochkin, a decision maker’s “inclination to
choose” can be expressed verbally only (e.g., through responses to a consumer
survey). The Karni-Safra introspective probability of the subset of priors
according to which  is preferred to  is a natural instance of the Minardi-
Savochkin representation in which Φ = 
In this paper, I propose an incentive-compatible procedure for eliciting
the inclination of a decision maker to select one act over another, thereby
lending the Minardi-Savochkin measure revealed-preference meaning. The
proposed scheme combines a quadratic scoring rule with menu choice. It of-
fers the decision maker the opportunity to choose from menus of acts designed
to induce her to reveal her introspective assessment of how likely she is to
choose one act over another. The proposed mechanism invokes the revealed-
preference approach to identify theoretical ingredients of models that depart
from the revealed preference methodology.
The elicitation problem addressed in this paper is fundamentally diﬀer-
ent from that dealt with in the literature on the elicitation of subjective
3A capacity measure on a measurable space (ΩΣ) has the properties Φ (∅) =
0Φ (Ω) = 1 and, for all  ∈ Σ Φ () ≤ Φ () whenever  ⊆ 
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probabilities. Two aspects of the problem render it distinct and diﬃcult.
First, with two exceptions, the literature dealing with probability elicita-
tion is concerned with observable events in an objective state space4 These
events are used to condition the subject’s payoﬀs. By contrast, this paper
deals with the elicitation of the probabilities of events in a subjective state
space.5 These events are subsets of unobservable priors. Consequently, the
events of interest are private information and cannot be used to condition
the subject’s payoﬀs.
Second, the utility function is inherently state dependent,6 and there is
no known probability elicitation scheme that yields unbiased estimate of the
subjective probabilities in the presence of state-dependent preferences. The
proposed mechanism overcomes both diﬃculties by embedding the scoring
rule in menu choice and exploiting the particular (linear) form in which the
subjective states (that is, the subjective prior probabilities) aﬀect the utility
function.
I. THE ELICITATION MECHANISM
A. The Analytical Framework
Let  be a finite state space and suppose that the decision maker believes
that the probability distribution on  is a random variable, e taking values
in the subset Π of the simplex ∆ ()  The set Π is interpreted as the set
of prior probability measures that figure in Bewley’s (2002) representation
of Knightian uncertainty. Let  := { :  → R} denote the subset of
Anscombe-Aumann acts whose payoﬀs are sums of money. For any acts 
and  in  let  ( ) denote the Minardi and Savochkin’s (2015) measure
of the inclination of a decision maker to choose  over 
Given   ∈  , let Π ( ) denote the event in Π consisting of subjec-
tive beliefs that favor  over  Formally, let  be a real-valued function on
the set of real numbers representing a subjective expected utility maximiz-
ing decision maker’s risk attitudes. For all  ∈  and  ∈ ∆ ()  define
4See discussion in section 4.2 below.
5The set of beliefs constitute a subjective state space a` la Kreps (1979).
6To grasp the this observation, consider acts that are real-valued functions on  rep-
resenting the monetary payoﬀs contingent on the states in  Let  denote a subjective
probability distribution on  representing the decision maker’s belief. Then the utility
of an act  depends on the subjective state  Formally,  ( ) = Σ∈ ( ()) () 
where  is a real-valued function on the reals.
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 ( ) = Σ∈ ( ()) ()  then
Π ( ) := { ∈ Π |  ( ) ≥  ( )} (3)
Let  denote the probability measure on ∆ () representing the decision
maker introspective second-order beliefs of Karni and Safra (2016) in (1).7
If  Â  then, by Knightian uncertainty, Π ( ) = Π Hence, the introspec-
tive beliefs  (Π ( )) = 1, and  ( ) = 1 If  Â  then Π ( ) = Π
 (Π ( )) = 0 and  ( ) = 0. If  and  are non-comparable then
Π ( ) ⊂ Π,  (Π ( )) ∈ (0 1) and  ( ) ∈ (0 1).
B. The Mechanism Described
The objective of the scheme described below is the elicitation of the prob-
ability,  (Π ( ))  that represents the decision maker’s introspective be-
liefs that the true distribution  on  is in Π ( )  The procedure embeds
quadratic scoring rules in menu choice in a way that makes the truthful rev-
elation of  (Π ( )) incentive compatible.8 It is assumed throughout that
the decision maker’s preferences exhibit Knightian uncertainty over acts and
their random choice behavior is depicted by second-order, introspective, be-
lief.
Because the event of interest is not observable, the elicitation scheme
cannot involve payoﬀs contingent on the event of interest. To overcome this
diﬃculty, the proposed mechanism oﬀers the decision maker a choice from a
menu that consists of the acts  and  that are modified to incorporate the
payoﬀs associated with a quadratic scoring rule. This elicitation procedure
harnesses the incentives built into the scoring rule to induce the decision
maker to choose her responses in a way that reveals her disposition to choose
 over 
To describe the proposed mechanism formally, let U be the set of real-
valued, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly monotonic increasing con-
cave utility functions on the set of real numbers, R. For every given  ∈ U
define a function  : R→ R by () = 10 ()  for all  ∈ R. Let
 := { |  ∈ U}
Given   ∈  the mechanism requires the decision maker to report
a number,  ∈ [0 1]. The decision maker is awarded the right to choose
7Let B denote the Borel sigma algebra on ∆ ()  then (∆ () B ) is the probability
space representing a decision maker’s introspective beliefs a` la Karni and Safra (2016).
8Section 4.2 provides some references to the literature on scoring rules.
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at a later date, before that state  ∈  becomes known, from the menu
{ ()   ()} where
 () := ( ()− (1−)2( ())∈ and  () := ( ()− 2 ( ()))∈
and   0 is a parameter selected by the designer to allow him to control
the proximity of the acts  () and  () to the acts of interest,  and ,
respectively. The role of the function  is to counteract the estimation
biases that are due to the curvature of the utility function.
C. The Mechanism Analyzed
The following theorem asserts that if a decision maker’s preference rela-
tion over acts exhibits Knightian uncertainty, her random choice behavior is
depicted by second-order belief and her risk attitudes are represented by a
utility function  ∈ U then, for every given   ∈  in the limit as  tends
to zero, the optimal choice of ∗ (;  ) under the mechanism reveals the
her probability  (Π ( )).
Theorem: If the preference relation exhibits random choice behavior
over acts depicted by a set of priors, Π second-order belief, , and a utility
function  ∈ U then lim→0 ∗ (;  ) =  (Π ( ))  for all   ∈ 
The proof is in the Appendix.
D. Examples
Consider a risk-neutral decision maker contemplating a choice between
two bets on the outcome of the next US presidential election. The bet 
pays $100 if the candidate of the Democratic party wins and nothing oth-
erwise. The bet  pays $85 if the candidate of the Democratic party wins
and $25 if the candidate of the Republican party wins. The decision maker
currently believes that the probability of the candidate of the Democratic
party winning the election is no greater than 0.75 and no less than 0.5. He
expects to have a clear idea closer to election day, when he will have to choose
between the two bets. The objective is to elicit the current inclination of the
decision maker to favor the bet  over the bet .
Given the menu = { } and the decision maker’s risk attitudes, under
the proposed scheme, the decision maker’s problem is to choose  ∈ [0 1] so
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as to maximize9 Z
Π(()())
£Σ∈( ()− (1− )2) ()¤  () (4)
+
Z
Π\Π(()())
£Σ∈ ¡ ()− 2¢ ()¤  () 
Let
 (0;) =
Z
Π((0)(0))
£Σ∈( ()− (1− )2) ()¤  () (5)
and
 (0;) =
Z
Π\Π((0)(0))
£Σ∈( ()− 2) ()¤  ()  (6)
Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition is:
(1−∗)
Z
Π(()())
 ()  ()+ (
0;∗)
0 |0=∗= 
∗
Z
Π\Π((0)(0))
 ()  ()+ (
0;∗)
0 |0=∗ 
(7)
But
 (0;∗)
0 |0=∗= Σ∈( ()−(1−)
2)ˆ () = Σ∈( ()−2)ˆ () =  (
0;∗)
0 |0=∗
where ˆ is in the intersection of the boundaries of Π ( ) and Π\Π ( ) 
Hence, (1 − ∗) (Π ( )) = ∗ (Π\Π ( ))  and, consequently, ∗ =
 (Π ( ))  In this case, because the marginal utility is constant, the elici-
tation procedure yields an unbiased estimate of the disposition to choose 
over  for all values of  and not just in the limit as  tends to zero.
Applied to the example of betting on the outcome of the election result,
∗ =  ({ ∈ [05 075] | 100  85 + (1− ) 25}) is the decision maker
current probabilistic belief that, at the time when he will have to choose
between  and  he will choose the bet 
9Risk neutrality implies that  () = 1 for all 
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The examples below illustrate how the elicitation mechanism is applied to
utility functions representing risk attitudes that are often invoked in economic
analysis.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion: Risk neutrality is a special case of the
class of utility functions, often used in applications in economics and finance,
displaying constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). For utility functions dis-
playing CRRA,  () =  for all  ∈ R, where  ∈ (0 1) is the measure
relative risk aversion. Hence, the menu defined by the elicitation mechanism
is:
{ () := ( ()− (1− )2 ())∈,  () := ( ()− 2 ())∈}
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion: In the case of constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA), it is easy to verify that  () =  where  is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. The corresponding menu is:
{ () := ( ()− (1− )2())∈,  () := ( ()− 2())∈}
Expo-Power Utility Function: The expo-power family of utility function
was first proposed by Saha (1993). The one-parameter variation, used in
Abdellaoui, Barrios, and Wakker (2007), is given by  () = −−  for
 6= 0 and  () = −1 for  = 0 For  ∈ (0 1] the one parameter expo-
power utility function displays decreasing absolute and increasing relative risk
aversion. In this case, for  ∈ (0 1)  () = 

 1− and the corresponding
menu is:
{ () := ( ()− (1− )21− )∈  () := ( ()− 21−

 )∈}
For  = 0  () = 2 and the corresponding menu is:
{ () := ( ()− (1− )22)∈  () := ( ()− 22)∈}
II. DISCUSSION
A. An Alternative Interpretation
The indecisiveness of a decision maker concerning a choice between courses
of action, that she will have to make sometime in the future may be due to
ambiguity regarding her prior beliefs. It may also be due to anticipation of
receiving new information that may aﬀect her posterior beliefs. In the latter
8
instance, the decision maker may have a unique prior and her hesitations re-
flect the uncertainty surrounding the anticipated new information that might
influence her choice. The decision maker’s posterior beliefs can be described
by a set of signal-contingent, posterior subjective probability distributions on
a state space. In this case, the decision maker may entertain a “second-order
belief” regarding the likelihoods of the signals whose canonical representa-
tion is the set of “first-order posterior beliefs.” Under this interpretation the
“second-order belief” constitutes the decision maker’s subjective information
structure.
Lu (2016) and Dillenberger, Lleras, Sadowski and Takeoka (2014) mod-
eled second-order belief on the set of posteriors. These models describe de-
cision makers who anticipate receiving private signals before choosing an act
from a menu of acts. In Lu’s model, decision makers are subjective expected
utility maximizers who receive private signals and whose choice from menu
of acts is governed by a posterior distribution on the states. A decision
maker’s information structure (that is, her beliefs on the set of signals) is
depicted by a distribution,  on the set of posteriors (the canonical signal
space) ∆ (). This second-order belief is revealed by a random choice rule
describing the decision maker’s actual choice behavior. In the special case of
doubleton menu, the probability, {} ()  that  is chosen form the menu
{ } according to the random choice rule , is given by:
{} () = 
Ã
{ ∈ ∆ () |X
∈
 ( ()) () ≥X
∈
 ( ()) ()}
!
 (8)
Dillenberger et al. model a decision maker who chooses among menus
of acts as if she has unique probability distribution over the set of posterior
distributions over the state space that she might face at the time of choosing
from the menu. The scenario envisioned is that before choosing an act from
a menu, the decision maker receives a signal that allows her to update her
prior probability distribution over the states. Given the posterior the decision
maker chooses the act from the menu that maximizes her expected utility.
A decision maker’s representation of preference relation on acts involve a
unique probability measure on a canonical signal space (that is, the set of
distributions on the state space) representing her subjective belief on the set
of posteriors. Presumably the choice of acts from the menu, which is not
part of their formal model, is random and corresponds to the rule depicted
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in (8). The mechanism of this paper is applicable to the elicitation of the
measure  in (8).
B. Related Literature
The study of incentive-compatible mechanisms designed to elicit experts
or decision makers beliefs, dubbed proper scoring rules, initiated by Brier
(1950) and Good (1952) has been extended (e.g., Savage [1971], Kadane and
Winkler [1988], Bickel (2007), Fang, Stinchcombe and Whinston [2010]) and
applied in experimental work (e.g., Nyarko and Schotter [2002]).10 These
schemes entail payoﬀs contingent on the observed event of interest. Because
this work concerns events of interest, namely, subsets of beliefs under which
some act preferable over another, that are not observable, the aforementioned
schemes are not directly applicable.
Chambers and Lambert (2014, 2016) and Karni (2016) introduce schemes
designed to elicit decision makers’ subjective probability of an event in the
objective state space as well as their second-order beliefs. The former work
involves the elicitation of subjective information structures of Bayesian de-
cision makers and their second-order beliefs on posterior subjective proba-
bilities of the event of interest. The latter work proposes a mechanism for
eliciting the set of priors of the event of interest and second-order beliefs on
this set and, in the case of Bayesian decision makers (that is, decision makers
whose beliefs are represented by a unique prior), also the subjective informa-
tion structures and second-order beliefs on posterior subjective probabilities.
The event in the support of the second-order beliefs is a set of subjective
probabilities that, by definition, are not publicly observable.
Despite this similarity, the mechanisms of Chambers and Lambert and
Karni are quite diﬀerent both in form in substance. Karni (2016) provides a
detailed discussion of the diﬀerences. The mechanism proposed by Chambers
and Lambert is designed to elicit the information structure in the choice-
based models of Dillenberger et al. (2014) and Lu (2016). Since these models
are anchored in the revealed preference methodology, it is not surprising
that the information can be elicited using revealed preference methods. By
contrast, the mechanism of this paper and the one proposed in Karni (2016)
invoke a revealed-preference approach to elicit introspective beliefs that are
articulated in models that depart from the revealed preference methodology.
10For a survey of proper scoring rules and their application see Gneiting and Raftery
(2004).
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C. Incentives and Biases
The analysis of the proposed mechanism makes it clear that, except in
the case of risk-neutral agents, the elicitation of the exact probability of the
set of priors that favor one act, say  , over another act, say  requires that
the deviations from the payoﬀs of acts of interest,  () −  and  () − 
introduced by the mechanism’s reward structure vanish in the limit. This
is the implication of the proper scoring rules and it is not specific to the
proposed scheme.
Generally speaking, elicitation schemes are measurement tools whose ac-
curacy depends on their incentive structure. Proper scoring rules present the
elicitor with a trade-oﬀ between the power of the incentives and the accu-
racy of measurement. In general, the more powerful the incentive, the less
accurate the measurement. The mechanism is still useful for obtaining an
approximation of the sought after value. Moreover, if the utility function is
approximately linear in the relevant range, application of the proposed mech-
anism with strong incentives can yield good approximations. Conceptually,
the novelty of mechanism introduced in this paper is that it constitutes a
revealed preference approach to the elicitation of information about belief
that is otherwise only gleaned by introspection and verbal testimony.
Another concern regarding the application of the mechanism is that the
utility function of the decision maker may not be known to the mechanism
designer. Suppose the decision maker is risk averse whose utility function is
not known. The mechanism can still be applied, assuming that the decision
maker is risk neutral.
Suppose that the decision maker’s utility function is  then, given   ∈ 
and applying the mechanism with  () = 1 for all . Following the analysis
in the proof of the theorem it is easy to verify that, in the limit, as  tends
to 0 the necessary and suﬃcient condition is:Z
Π(()())
[Σ∈0 ( ()) ()]
 (Π ( ))  () (1−
∗) (Π ( )) = ∗ (Π\Π ( ))
Z
Π\Π((0)(0))
[Σ∈0( (
 (Π\Π (
Hence, the mechanism yields a biased estimate of  (Π ( )) whose magni-
tude depends on expected marginal utilities under  and  If these values
are close to one another (e.g., if the utility function is approximately lin-
ear in the range of the images of  and ) then the mechanism elicits good
approximation of the probability of the event of interest.
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D. Concluding Remark
Interest in a decision maker’s inclination to choose among alternative
courses of action stems from the realistic presumption that in many situations
the preference relation over the choice set might not be complete, giving rise
to indecisiveness. The level of confidence a decision maker feels regarding her
disposition to choose may be articulated verbally. Minardi and Savochkin
(2015) mention marketing surveys as an example of a tool intended to elicit
decision makers’ level of confidence in their preferences for one alternative
over another. They also note that “using this type of data in economics will
probably require implementing some sort of an incentive scheme.” (Minardi
and Savochkin [2015] p. 301). The mechanism described in this paper is one
such scheme.
12
APPENDIX
Proof of the Theorem:
Fix   ∈  Then under the scoring rule, the decision maker problem is:
Choose  ∈ [0 1] so as to maximizeZ
Π(()())
£Σ∈( ()− (1− )2 ( ())) ()¤  () (9)
+
Z
Π\Π(()())
£Σ∈( ()− 2 ( ())) ()¤  () 
Denote the solution by ∗ Let
 (0;) :=
Z
Π((0)(0))
£Σ∈( ()− (1− )2 ( ())) ()¤  ()
(10)
and
 (0;) :=
Z
Π\Π((0)(0))
£Σ∈( ()− 2 ( ())) ()¤  ()  (11)
Then the necessary and suﬃcient condition is:
(1−∗)
Z
Π(()())
£Σ∈0 ¡( ()− (1− ∗)2 ( ()))¢  ( ()) ()¤  ()+ (0;∗)0 |0=∗
(12)
−∗
Z
Π\Π((0)(0))
£Σ∈0( ()− ∗2 ( ())) ( ()) ()¤  ()+ (0;∗)0 |0=∗= 0
In the limit, as  → 0  (∗) =  ,  (∗) = . But,
0( ()) ( ()) = 0( ()) ( ()) =  ∀ ∈  (13)
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and
lim→0
 (0;∗)
0 |0=∗= Σ∈( ())ˆ () = Σ∈ ( ()) ˆ () = lim→0
 (0;∗)
0 |0=∗ 
(14)
where ˆ is in the intersection of the boundaries of Π ( ) and Π\Π ( ) 11
Hence (12) implies that, in the limit as  tends to zero,
(1− ∗) (Π ( )) = ∗ (Π\Π ( ))  (15)
Thus, lim→0 ∗ (;  ) := ∗ =  (Π ( ))  ¥
11That such ˆ exist follows from the non-comparability of  and 
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